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NOTES
LIMITATIONS ON THE STRUCTURAL WORK
ACT-TENENBAUM v. CITY OF CHICAGO
The Illinois Structural Work Act' was enacted in 1907 to provide
protection for structural workers engaged in ultrahazardous activities.'
Two advantages accrue to injured workers who bring actions under the
statute. Many of the difficulties inherent in a common law negligence
suit are avoided.3 In addition, third parties4 such as owners,5 contrac-
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60-69 (1973). This Note deals specifically with sections 60
and 69, the applicable parts which provide:
Section 60
[A]II scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical
contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this
State for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of
any house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected and
constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and
constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to
the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or
passing under or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling of
any material that may be used or deposited thereon.
Section 69
Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person having charge
of the erection, construction, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any
building, bridge, viaduct or other structure within the provisions of this act,
shall comply with all the terms thereof, and any . . . person violating any of
the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
For any injury to person or property, occasioned by any wilful violations of
this act, or wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action
shall accrue to the party injured, for any direct damages sustained thereby; and
in case of loss of life by reason of such wilful violation or wilful failure as
aforesaid, a right of action shall accrue to the widow of the person so killed, his
lineal heirs or adopted children; or to any other person or persons who were,
before such loss of life, dependent for support on the person or persons so killed,
for a like recovery of damages for the injuries sustained by reason of such loss
of life or lives.
2. See, e.g., Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156, 106 N.E. 236 (1914); Claffy v.
Chicago Dock & Canal Co., 249 Ill. 210, 94 N.E. 551 (1911); Bruen v. Burton Auto Spring
Corp., 130 Ill.App.2d 477, 266 N.E.2d 176 (1st Dist. 1970).
3. In common law actions, defendants are held to a standard of ordinary and reasonable
care; contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule are defenses.
Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 22 Ill. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961). These are
not defenses to an action brought under the Structural Work Act. Schmid v. United
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tors,6 and architects7 can be held liable for injuries resulting from viola-
tions of the Act.8
Illinois courts have traditionally construed the Act liberally in order
to effectuate the legislative goal of providing a safe working area.' In
interpreting the legislative intent, the courts have considered the evil
which the Act is designed to remedy,"0 as well as the words of the statute.
Key terms such as "scaffold,"" "structure,' 2 "wilful violation,"'" and
States, 273 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1959); Lindsey v. Harlan E. Moore & Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 432,
297 N.E.2d 8 (4th Dist. 1973); Pantaleo v. Gamin, 106 Ill.App.2d 116, 245 N.E.2d 618 (1st
Dist. 1969); Palier v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 81 Ill. App.2d 1, 225 N.E. 2d 67 (1st Dist.
1967).
4. Originally, the Structural Work Act was designed to hold employers criminally and
civilly liable for violations of its standards. However, the Workmen's Compensation Act
exempted employers from such liability. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138 et seq. (1973).
The Structural Work Act has thus become an instrument for imposing liability on third
parties.
5. See, e.g., Schmid v. United States, 273 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1959); Pankey v. Hiram
Walker & Sons, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 609 (S.D. Ill. 1958); Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. &
P. Ry., 22 Ill. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961); John Griffiths & Son Co. v. National
Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill. 331, 141 N.E. 739 (1923).
6. See,e.g., Pankey v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 609 (S.D. Ill. 1958);
Pantaleo v. Gamm, 106 Ill.App.2d 116, 245 N.E.2d 618 (1st Dist. 1969); Yankey v. Oscar
Bohlin & Son, Inc., 37 IlI.App.2d 457, 186 N.E.2d 57 (1st Dist. 1962); Oldham v. Kubinski,
37 Ill.App.2d 65, 185 N.E.2d 270 (2d Dist. 1962) (subcontractor).
7. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 57 Ill. 2d 184, 311 N.E.2d 134 (1974);
Miller v. DeWitt, 37 I1. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967); Holt v. A.L. Salzman & Sons, 88
Ill.App.2d 306, 232 N.E.2d 537 (1st Dist. 1967).
8. The Act does not impose absolute liability but requires that the defendant have
charge of the work. Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 22 Ill. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d
785 (1961). The phrase "having charge of" is not limited to supervision and control of the
scaffold, but is a broad concept to be used to afford maximum protection for workmen's
injuries. Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965).
9. Bounougias v. Republic Steel Corp., 277 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1960); Halberstadt v.
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 55 Ill. 2d 121, 302 N.E.2d 64 (1973); Bruen v. Burton Auto
Spring Corp., 130 Ill.App.2d 477, 266 N.E.2d 176 (1st Dist. 1970).
10. Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 22 Ill. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961);
Brackett v. Osborne, 44 Ill.App.2d 441, 195 N.E.2d 8 (2d Dist. 1963).
11. The courts have found the Act applicable to various devices by finding them to be
"scaffolds .. .or other mechanical contrivances," and thus covered by the Act. See
Bounougias v. Republic Steel Corp., 277 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1960) (drum of an overhead
crane); Oldham v. Kubinski, 37 Ill.App.2d 65, 185 N.E.2d 270 (2d Dist. 1962) (Drott skid
shovel). In this Note the term "scaffold" refers to any device which will invoke the safe-
guards of section 60.
12. In Warren v. Meeker, 55 11. 2d 108, 302 N.E.2d 54 (1973), the court held that a grain
bin was a "structure" under the Act. A trench for a sewer system was held to be a structure
in Navlyt v. Kalinich, 53 Ill. 2d 137, 290 N.E.2d 219 (1972). Courts have refused to extend
the status of structure to movable personal property. See Juenger v. Bucyrus-Erie Co.,
286 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Ill. 1968) (world record size shovel); Farley v. Marion Power Shovel
Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 328 N.E.2d 318 (1975) (strip mining shovel).
13. Wilful violations are not necessarily knowing, intentional or even reckless. A person
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"having charge of"'" have been broadly defined. In this manner the
Illinois judiciary has molded the Structural Work Act into a significant
instrument for the redress of injuries to workmen.
Although the legislature used the term "scaffold" in section 60' it did
not define what instrumentalities would constitute safe scaffolding."I
Wielding the liberal construction maxim, however, the courts have ap-
plied the Act to items ranging from a plank to a skid shovel when they
were temporarily used to support workmen. 7 Nevertheless, the Illinois
courts were hesitant to find that a permanent part of the structure being
erected was a "scaffold" or "support" under the statute, even when a
workman stood on it to perform his duties."8 They insisted that a scaffold
was, by common definition, a device of a temporary nature. 9 When
faced with this issue in Louis v. Barenfanger,° the Illinois Supreme
can be held liable for a condition which he should have discovered by exercising reasonable
care. See Schmid v. United States, 273 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1959); Juliano v. Oravec, 53 111.
2d 566, 293 N.E.2d 897 (1973); Jones v. S.S. & E. Corp., 112 Ill.App.2d 79, 250 N.E.2d
829 (1st Dist. 1969); Braden v. Shell Oil Co., 24 Ill.App.2d 252, 164 N.E.2d 235 (4th Dist.
1960).
14. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
15. Structural Work Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 (1973), partially quoted in note 1
supra.
16. Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156, 106 N.E. 236 (1914) (what constitutes a
safe, suitable scaffold is a question of fact for the jury to determine based on the particular
circumstances). See Karris v. Goldman, 118 Ill.App.2d 85, 254 N.E.2d 605 (1st Dist. 1969)
(test of safety of scaffold is not limited to sturdiness or structural integrity, but it must
be of a size suitable for anticipated equipment; a question for the jury).
17. See cases cited in note 11 supra; Frick v. O'Hare-Chicago Corp., 70 Ill.App.2d 303,
217 N.E.2d 552 (1st Dist. 1966) (plank on top of wooden concrete form held to be scaffold
since it was intended to be and was used as one).
18. See Bohannon v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 72 Ill.App.2d 397, 219 N.E.2d 627
(1st Dist. 1966) (injuries sustained in fall from strut not compensable because strut was
permanent part of ceiling being built); Parizon v. Granite City Steel Co., 71 fll.App.2d
53, 218 N.E.2d 27 (5th Dist. 1966) (roof temporarily used for support not covered by the
Act); Thon v. Johnson, 30 Ill.App.2d 317, 174 N.E.2d 400 (2d Dist. 1961) (form constructed
to hold concrete for stairway landing was not a "scaffold" as required by the Act).
19. See, e.g., Parizon v. Granite City Steel Co., 71 Ill.App.2d 53, 218 N.E.2d 27 (5th
Dist. 1966). The court refused to use the liberal construction doctrine to enlarge the scope
of the statute. It felt that if exclusion of a permanent part of the structure was a defect in
the Act, it would have to be remedied by the legislature. The dissenting opinion argued
that temporary use of the roof as a support was contemplated by the parties and that the
legislative intent required extension of the Act to such situations. Two years later, the
Illinois Supreme Court followed the reasoning of the Parizon dissent in Louis v. Barenfan-
ger, 39 Ill. 2d 445, 236 N.E.2d 724 (1968).
20. 39 Ill. 2d 445, 236 N.E.2d 724 (1968), criticized in Note, 73 DICK. L. REV. 533 (1968-
1969). Until Barenfanger, failure to provide scaffolding was not actionable under the
Structural Work Act. It was thought that the Act came into play only after scaffolding
19761
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Court held that there was a duty to provide scaffolding and that a
permanent part of a structure could come within the definition of a
scaffold.
However, in its recent decision in Tenenbaum v. City of Chicago,"' the
Illinois Supreme Court has indicated that this trend of liberal construc-
tion may not be continued. Tenenbaum rejected the broad definition of
"scaffold" allowed by the appellate court" and attempted to clarify the
requirements for designating a permanent part of a structure as a scaf-
fold. In addition, the court enunciated a requirement that the injury
sustained must be related to the hazardous nature of the instrumental-
ity causing it. As a result, the scope of the Structural Work Act has
apparently been narrowed and the protection potentially available to
workmen has been decreased. This Note will discuss these two aspects
of Tenenbaum and their probable impact on the coverage afforded by
section 60.
In Tenenbaum the plaintiff fell from a permanent part of an under-
ground water treatment plant which was under construction. The struc-
ture was composed of three levels-a roof at ground level, an intermedi-
ate level, and a basement. At the east end of the structure a nine-foot
opening was left in the intermediate level to form a chamber. This
chamber was a part of the permanent structure and was to be used to
"baffle" water. 3 Tenenbaum was walking on the intermediate level
checking for debris and wood" when he dropped his flashlight. 5 While
searching for it, he took a few steps forward and tripped into the baffle
had been used. Morck v. Nicosia, 91 Ill.App.2d 327, 235 N.E.2d 287 (1st Dist. 1968);
Bradley v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 56 Ill.App.2d 482, 206 N.E.2d 276 (lst Dist. 1965).
21. 60 IIl. 2d 363, 325 N.E.2d 607 (1975).
22. Tenenbaum v. City of Chicago, 11 Ill.App.3d 987, 297 N.E.2d 716 (1st Dist. 1973).
The appellate court had interpreted Louis v. Barenfanger, 39 Ill. 2d 445, 236 N.E.2d 724
(1968), to allow coverage under section 60. It held that the intermediate level from which
Tenebaum fell was being used in the performance of duties within the purview of his
employment, and was a scaffold or support covered by the Act. For a presentation of the
facts upon which this holding was based, see notes 23-27 and accompanying text infra.
The appellate court opinion is discussed in notes 28-30 and accompanying text infra.
23. Upon completion, the entire structure was to be filled with water. The baffle cham-
ber was to be used to "baffle" water back and forth as part of the mixing process. During
construction, materials and equipment were hoisted through this chamber. 60 I1. 2d at
367, 371, 325 N.E.2d at 610, 613.
24. Tenenbaum had sent two men to remove debris and wood, but was told by a city
engineer that the clean-up operation was not satisfactory. He therefore went to inspect
the area himself. Id. at 367, 325 N.E.2d at 610-11.
25. No provision had been made for permanent lighting because the structure was to
be under water. The temporary lights did not work so Tenenbaum used his flashlight. As
he neared the baffle chamber, something hit his arm and he dropped the flashlight. Id.
at 367, 325 N.E.2d at 611.
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chamber. Tenenbaum testified that he felt the edge of a ladder, tried
to balance himself, but fell to the concrete floor of the basement. He
brought suit under the Structural Work Act 26 against the City of Chi-
cago, as owner of the premises, and a contractor working on the struc-
ture. 7
On appeal from a jury verdict in favor of Tenenbaum, the defendants
contended that the Structural Work Act was not applicable to the facts
presented.28 The appellate court held that section 60 was applicable, but
reversed on other grounds.28 Two theories were advanced for holding
section 60 applicable. First, the court concluded that the level was being
used as a scaffold within the meaning of Barenfanger, and that the jury
could find that the placement of the ladder made the "scaffold" unsafe.
Under the second theory, the jury could find that the ladder itself was
a protected instrumentality which had been placed in a dangerous man-
ner." The Illinois Supreme Court rejected both appellate court theories,
26. The original complaint was based on common law negligence. Tenenbaum filed an
amended complaint prior to trial containing an additional count charging wilful violations
of sections 60 and 66 of the Structural Work Act. A third count alleged wilful violations
of the Safeguards During Construction Ordinance of the City of Chicago. CHICAGO, ILL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 75, §§ 1 et seq. (1974). Count I was dismissed prior to trial, and the
case went to the jury on Counts II and III.
27. The defendant contractor was O'Neil Construction Company. The City of Chicago,
as owner, had contracted with several prime contractors for construction of the water-
treatment plant, including co-defendant O'Neil. O'Neil was the first contractor on the job,
and had erected the structure. Tenenbaum was a labor foreman for Link Belt Corp., prime
contractor for installation of chemical mixing and scraping equipment. There was no
contractual relationship between Link Belt and O'Neil.
28. 11 Ill.App.3d 987, 297 N.E.2d 716 (1st Dist. 1973).
29. The appellate court reversed on trial errors, remanded for a new trial, and thereafter
issued a certificate of importance. 60 Il. 2d at 365, 325 N.E.2d at 610.
30. 11 Ill.App.3d 987, 297 N.E.2d 716 (1st Dist. 1973). The appellate court also held that
the defendants could be found liable under section 66 for failure to barricade an opening
that had been used for hoisting construction materials. The requirement of barricading
was not limited to the time hoisting was in progress, but was interpreted to extend to any
period when there was danger of a workman falling into the opening.
Justice Egan, in a Special Concurrence, upheld the reversal on trial errors and also
found the Structural Work Act inapplicable. He maintained that it was immaterial
whether the intermediate level was a scaffold, since the plaintiff did not make that allega-
tion. It was the ladder which allegedly brought the Act into play. However, for Tenen-
baum's injury to be covered by the Act, it must have occurred when the ladder was used
as a ladder. If not, the Act would be applicable to any injury as long as one of the devices
named in the statute was used. Justice Egan offered the illustration of a workman tripping
over a ladder placed against a wall; covering such an injury would strain the interpretation
of the Act. The Justice maintained that the ladder was not being used as a ladder in the
instant case, and section 60 was therefore inapplicable. He also felt that the duty to
19761
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and held that section 60 was not applicable to the facts of Tenen-
baum.3
THE DEFINITION OF "SCAFFOLD"
The court first dealt with the contention that the intermediate level
from which Tenenbaum fell was a "scaffold." It held that the level was
not a "scaffold" since it was not being used as a platform or scaffold to
complete construction but was, in fact, a completed floor. To reach this
conclusion, Barenfanger and the major post-Barenfanger decisions were
distinguished." After noting that Barenfanger had been decided on the
pleadings, the Tenenbaum court explained the rationale of this land-
mark case. When there is a failure to provide scaffolding and a part of
the structure is used temporarily for support in lieu of a scaffold, that
part of the structure is a "scaffold" within the meaning of the Act.
Applying this reading of Barenfanger to the facts of Tenenbaum, the
justices found no showing of a "need for, or failure to provide . . .a
scaffold"33 and determined that the level was not being used as a scaf-
fold.
Thus, the Tenenbaum court has clarified the requirements which
must be fulfilled to classify a permanent part of a structure as a "scaf-
fold." A finding of a failure to provide scaffolding must be coupled with
temporary use of a part of the structure as a substitute for the missing
scaffold. An examination of other decisions applying Barenfanger re-
barricade no longer existed. Therefore, Justice Egan wanted to reverse without remanding.
Id. at 1010, 297 N.E.2d at 731.
Justice Adesko dissented. He felt that the case was within the Structural Work Act, that
it had been properly tried, and that the trial court's decision should be affirmed. Id. at
1019, 297 N.E.2d at 737.
31. 60 Ill. 2d 363, 325 N.E.2d 607 (1975). The supreme court did affirm the appellate
court's decision that section 66 of the Act was applicable. It held that the duty to barricade
did not terminate when hoisting operations ended but continued as long as there was a
danger that workmen would fall into the opening. Justice Ryan, who dissented from this
view, maintained that section 66 required barricades only when hoisting was in progress,
or after hoisting if the opening was temporary in nature. Id. at 376, 325 N.E.2d at 615.
The supreme court reversed and remanded for errors in the trial of Count III. The trial
judge had instructed the jury that violations of the city ordinance imposed liability on
defendants without regard to issues of negligence and contributory negligence. The su-
preme court found that the instruction was prejudicial error.
32. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text infra for the Tenenbaum court's interpreta-
tion of St. John v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 54 Ill. 2d 271, 296 N.E.2d 740 (1973). See
note 34 infra for the court's treatment of Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 55 Ill.
2d 121, 302 N.E.2d 64 (1973). Juliano v. Oravec, 53 Ill. 2d 566, 293 N.E.2d 897 (1973),
involved a workman whose foot went through the subflooring upon which he was walking.
The opinion contained language which stated that the subflooring was a stay or support.
The Tenenbaum court disregarded that dicta because the holding of the case was based
on a violation of section 63 of the Act.
33. 60 11. 2d at 370, 325 N.E.2d at 612.
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veals that the importance of both elements had not been previously
recognized. Courts allowing recovery have consistently found a tempo-
rary use of part of the structure as a scaffold; they have not consistently
found a failure to provide scaffolding.34 In past cases in which highly
dangerous and unsuitable supports such as poles or columns were used,
the failure to provide scaffolding may have been implied from the
facts.35 In future cases involving such devices, the obvious dangers they
present may be used to support the required finding of failure to provide
a suitable scaffold. However, when a workman is on a floor or level of
the building the obvious danger is less. Proving a failure to provide
scaffolding in such instances will be correspondingly more difficult as
the danger becomes less obvious.
34. Schroeder v. C.F. Braun & Co., 502 F.2d 235 (7th Cir. 1974), explicitly found a
failure to provide protective scaffolding and held that beams, though permanent parts of
the structure, were within the purview of the Act.
In Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 13 Ill.App.3d 108, 300 N.E.2d 1 (5th Dist.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 57 Ill. 2d 376, 313 N.E.2d 457 (1974), the court held that a
jury could find an implicit agreement that plaintiff would stand on top of the grain bin
to perform his work. A basis for this finding was testimony that a scaffold could have been
built but was not. However, this case centered on the issue of whether the defendant had
charge of the work, not whether the grain bin was a scaffold. The complaint in Halberstadt
v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 55 Ill. 2d 121, 302 N.E.2d 64 (1973), charged that as a result
of the failure to provide a safe scaffold plaintiffs husband was required to use corroded
hooks on a building as support for his safety belt. On the major question presented, the
court held that a window washer could be protected by the Structural Work Act. The
opinion noted that under the Barenfanger rationale a workman using the window ledge
and hooks could be protected. The decision did not specifically find a failure to provide
scaffolding, though it was alleged in the complaint and could be inferred from the facts.
The Tenenbaum court did not feel that Halberstadt made section 60 applicable to the case
at hand.
Wood v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 343 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1972), involved a
wooden utility pole used temporarily as a scaffold. The court followed Barenfanger but
made no mention of a failure to provide scaffolding. Similarly, in Spiezio v. Common-
wealth Edison Co., 91 Ill.App.2d 392, 235 N.E.2d 323 (1st Dist. 1968), the court found that
a steel column came within the Act when it was intended to be, and was, put to temporary
use as a support. There was no explicit finding of a failure to provide scaffolding.
Barenfanger was extended to a roof in St. John v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 54 111.
2d 271, 296 N.E.2d 740 (1973) without finding a failure to provide scaffolding. In Mundt
v. Ragnar Benson Inc., 18 Ill.App.3d 758, 310 N.E.2d 633 (1st Dist. 1974), aff'd No. 46752
(Ill. Sup. Ct. June 2, 1975), rehearing docketed (September 1975), plaintiff fell through a
hole while walking on wooden flooring that was to be covered with concrete. The court,
following Barenfanger, stated that the structure on which plaintiff was working was a
scaffold, yet did not find a failure to provide scaffolding. This was dicta, however, because
they affirmed the lower court's refusal to allow an amended complaint adding a count
under the Structural Work Act.
35. See Wood v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 343 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Spiezio
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 91 Ill.App.2d 392, 235 N.E.2d 323 (1st Dist. 1968), both
discussed in note 34 supra.
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The Tenenbaum decision provides limited guidelines for predicting
what fact situations involving permanent structures will fulfill the
Barenfanger requirements. The court focuses on the stage of completion
of the level and whether it is being used as a scaffold. These two factors
now appear to be essential considerations in determining when flooring
will be labeled a "scaffold." Unfortunately, the definitions and
perimeters of these concepts are not clarified in Tenenbaum.
This problem can be highlighted by comparing Tenenbaum with the
Supreme Court's earlier decision in St. John v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons
Co.36 In the latter case, the decedent had been working on the roof of a
plant under construction, removing debris and stacking runways, when
he fell through an opening which was later to be filled with heating,
ventilating, and lighting equipment. The Barenfanger rationale was ex-
tended to hold that a rooftop being put to temporary use as a scaffold
was within the Act; it was irrelevant that the rooftop was intended to
be a permanent part of the building." The Tenenbaum court, however,
decided that St. John dealt with a "narrow question" when it rejected
the contention that a "roof, with openings to be later closed, could not,
as a matter of law, be considered a temporary platform or support."3
The facts in St. John and Tenenbaum are very close, and the attempt
to make meaningful distinctions between them gives little assistance in
determining when a level will be covered by the Act. The court may be
focusing on the fact that in St. John the openings in the roof were to be
filled; the level could therefore be considered incomplete. In contrast,
the Tenenbaum decision stresses that the level in question had been
completed.39 This emphasis on completion may create some confusion
in the future because the point at which a level will be considered
complete remains indefinite. In Tenenbaum the court determined that
the level was complete with reference to section 60, but admitted that
dangers to workmen continued under other sections of the Act.4" More-
36. 54 Ill. 2d 271, 296 N.E.2d 740 (1973).
37. Id. at 274, 296 N.E.2d at 741-42. It should be noted that St. John does not mention
a failure to provide scaffolding. See note 34 supra.
38. 60 Ill. 2d at 370, 325 N.E.2d at 612. In his Special Concurrence to St. John, Justice
Davis pointed out that the majority's holding was far from narrow. He suggested that the
rule that a roof temporarily being used as a platform falls under the Act was too broad
and not warranted by Barenfanger. Justice Davis warned that the holding implied that
every place a workman stood was a scaffold. His position was that at some point a
structure ceased to be a scaffold and became a building. However, he concluded that the
Act was applicable to St. John because the roof was not complete and was being used as
a scaffold for insertion of equipment in the openings. 54 111. 2d at 276, 296 N.E.2d at 743.
39. 60 Ill. 2d at 370, 325 N.E.2d at 612.
40. Section 66 of the Act was applicable to the facts since the jury could find that
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over, the stage of completion had not advanced far enough to pre-
clude the jury from finding that the defendants were still in charge of
the work.4'
Comparing St. John with Tenenbaum suggests that the line deter-
mining completeness may be drawn when the level is physically con-
structed, but before clean-up operations are necessarily finished. This
would put such activities outside the protection of the Act if done after
completion. For example, if the openings in the St. John roof had been
filled, would it have been a completed level? If so, the victim's clean-
up activities would have been outside the Act.
The issue of completeness raises another question. Can a completed
level ever be classified as a scaffold?" Fact situations can be envisioned
in which a completed floor could be used as a temporary support for
other work. Protection may be afforded in such cases by reliance on
another concept suggested in the decision-use of the area as a scaf-
fold. 3 For example, a worker might stand on a completed level in order
to perform work on an uncompleted part of the structure. If the worker
is found to be using the level as a scaffold, he may still be under the
protective umbrella of section 60.
Unfortunately, the definition of "use as a scaffold" is ambiguous. In
comparing the facts of Tenenbaum with those of St. John, the Illinois
Supreme Court said that Tenenbaum was using the area as a floor, while
the injured party in St. John was using the area as a scaffold. 4 If "use
as a scaffold" refers to the type of work being performed by the individ-
ual, this comparison creates some confusion. In both Tenenbaum and
St. John the party injured was searching for debris.45 The term may also
relate to the individual's work in the larger context. For example, the
dangers continued in the area of the opening even though hoisting operations were com-
pleted. See note 31 supra.
41. 60 I1. 2d at 374-75, 325 N.E.2d at 614. The defendant, O'Neil, argued that its work
in the area had been completed and therefore it was not in charge of the work. The court
noted that even if the contractor had left the baffle area temporarily, its work had not
been accepted by the city. It was still required to make tests and patch leaks on the
structure. Therefore, the jury could find that the defendant was in charge of the work and
liable for the injuries suffered by Tenenbaum.
42. The answer to this question is crucial. The statute applies to "repairing, alterations,
removal or painting of any ... structure." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 (1973). See note 1
supra. If completed levels are totally excluded as scaffolds, any of the above work per-
formed on such a level will be unprotected.
43. 60 Ill. 2d at 370, 325 N.E.2d at 612.
44. Id.
45. A distinction may be found in the fact that Tenenbaum was inspecting the area for
the debris but not picking it up. St. John was physically moving the debris. If this is the
crucial distinction, it further highlights the definitional problem.
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court notes that Tenenbaum's employer was assembling pedestals and
infers that they were not using the level as a scaffold in furtherance of
construction." While it is unclear which activity was determinative in
Tenenbaum, the decision suggests that the work of the individual, the
employer, or both, are proper subjects for examination. Where the court
chooses to concentrate its attention may be a crucial factor in determin-
ing the applicability of section 60.11
The concept of "use as a scaffold" may also be employed to exclude
certain activities from coverage. It seems that traditional scaffolds could
be used for a variety of activities, including walking and transporting
materials. However, the decision indicates that the court may be looking
primarily for activity which can be characterized as constructing. If this
approach is continued, only activities which are construction-oriented
would constitute "use as a scaffold" and, therefore, be protected. This
may occur only when the level is completed.48 However, "use as a scaf-
fold" might also be applied to exclude activities performed on an un-
completed level.49
46. 60 Ill. 2d at 370, 325 N.E.2d at 612. Link Belt was preparing pedestals on which
machinery would be mounted. The Tenenbaum court did not compare Link Belt's activi-
ties with those of St. John's employer. The latter was general contractor for building a
new plant. The majority opinion found that at the time of St. John's accident the roof
was being covered with felt, tar, and gravel. 54 Ill. 2d at 272, 296 N.E.2d at 741 (1973).
However, Justice Davis concurred with the majority because "the roof was being used as
a scaffold for the purpose of inserting integral parts of the roof's structure." 54 Ill. 2d at
276, 296 N.E.2d at 743. We must assume that Justice Davis was talking about the work
of the employer, though it is unclear exactly what work they were directly engaged in at
the time of the accident. It is important to note, however, that the majority found that
St. John and Edwards, his co-worker, were using the roof as a "scaffold" and their imme-
diate work was collecting debris and stacking runways.
47. Consider the following examples:
A. Employer is assembling equipment while the employee is inserting the equipment
into the walls of the structure.
B. Employer is inserting equipment into openings in the structure while the employee
is examining the area for debris.
In example A, the employer would be using the level as a floor according to Tenenbaum,
but the employee would be performing work analogous to what Justice Davis found to be
"use as a scaffold" in St. John. In example B, the employer would be using the level as a
scaffold according to Justice Davis, while the employee, like Tenenbaum, would be using
the level as a floor. In each case protection will depend upon which activity the court
focuses its attention,
48. If the completeness of the level does not automatically exclude the workman from
the Act, the court may consider how the completed level is being used. For example, if it
is used as a support to paint a neighboring structure, such an analysis probably would
provide protection for the worker. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
49. When work is being performed on an incomplete level, the court may continue to
follow St. John and hold that the level is being used as a scaffold. However, the court may
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While the concepts discussed above are presently nebulous, they seem
to be tools the court will use to establish new boundaries within which
the Act will apply. Barenfanger and St. John extended section 60 to
allow permanent levels of a structure to be classified as scaffolds.
Tenenbaum establishes that not all such levels are covered under all
circumstances.5 0
THE INHERENT-DANGER REQUIREMENT
In addition to adding new dimensions to the definition of scaffold,
Tenenbaum has independent significance for Structural Work Act
claimants because it enunciates a standard for judging when a cause of
action arises under the Act. After Tenenbaum, use of a device named
in the Act is insufficient. The injury must have "some connection with
the hazardous nature of one of the devices named in Section [601 of the
Act."5 Applying this rule to the case before it, the court made the
observation that the inherent danger of a ladder is that workmen or
materials may fall off or the ladder itself may fall. While acknowledging
that the ladder may have contributed to Tenenbaum's injury, the court
found that he could have suffered the same injury by tripping over some
other object. Therefore, his was not an injury directly related to a partic-
ular hazard of working on a ladder."
This inherent danger theory is similar to the position advocated by
Justice Ryan's dissent in McNellis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. " He
decide to examine the activity performed and exclude the workman if he is not using the
level as a scaffold. For example, suppose Link Belt had been assembling pedestals on an
incomplete floor when a workman fell into the baffle chamber. Would the court have
allowed protection because the level was not complete or denied protection because the
level was not being "used as a scaffold?" It seems that protection would be denied even
though the level was incomplete, inasmuch as temporary use in lieu of a scaffold is
required under Barenfanger. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
50. Previous decisions have warned that overbroad expansion of definitions can bring
about the result that any place a workman stands thereby becomes a scaffold within the
meaning of the Act. St. John v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 54 111. 2d 271, 275, 296 N.E.2d
740, 742 (1973) (Davis, J., Special Concurrence); accord, Thon v. Johnson, 30 Ill.App.2d
317, 174 N.E.2d 400 (2d Dist. 1961); cf. Bradley v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 56 Il.
App.2d 482, 206 N.E.2d 276 (1st Dist. 1965). The Tenenbaum decision may be a response
to this caveat.
51. 60 11. 2d at 371, 325 N.E.2d at 613.
52. Id. at 370-71, 325 N.E.2d at 612-13. The court's argument here is reminiscent of the
illustration given by Justice Egan in his Special Concurrence to Tenenbaum. See note 30
supra.
53. 58 Ill. 2d 146, 317 N.E.2d 573 (1974). In McNellis, plaintiffs husband was fatally
injured while unloading a railroad car, without using the available cranes. The court held
that the unloading was an integral part of the erection of a generator located on a construc-
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maintained that for an injury to be covered by the Act it must be
connected with the dangers inherent in a specific activity listed in the
statute. In his separate opinion in Tenenbaum, Justice Ryan noted that
the court had applied this analysis to section 60.-" The court's willing-
ness to adopt the concept may indicate that its view of section 60 has
narrowed.
The inherent danger theory will probably be used as an instrument
of limitation. Injuries will be excluded if they are not derived from a
particular hazard of a device enumerated in the statute. Tenenbaum
indicates that the present justices of the supreme court view the legisla-
tive intent conservatively. Therefore, their future decisions will prob-
ably define these hazards narrowly. Ironically, past courts which have
viewed the legislative intent liberally have also focused on the inherent
danger, which they have labeled the "evils to be remedied."" These evils
were broadly defined and used as a rationale for expansion of the Act.
CONCLUSION
The majority of the Illinois Supreme Court appears to be following the
philosophy of Justice Ryan in interpreting section 60 of the Structural
Work Act. Justice Ryan has asserted that the protection afforded by the
statute does not extend to all construction activities." The limitations
set up in Tenenbaum will prevent the section from being used as a
panacea for many of the injuries suffered by workmen.
The applicability of section 60 has been circumscribed by the
Tenenbaum decision. It is possible that other sections of the Act will be
used to afford protection in its stead." However, Justice Ryan has also
objected to the expansion of other sections of the Act."8 If his views
tion site away from the unloading platform. This decision was based on the contract
between the parties which stated that the unloading was part of the construction work.
54. 60 11. 2d at 376, 325 N.E.2d at 615. Justice Ryan focused on inherent danger in his
dissent from the application of section 66 to Tenenbaum. He maintained that the legisla-
ture intended to provide protection only for the "special hazards" created by openings
when they were used for hoisting materials. The hazard of falling into a permanent open-
ing after hoisting operations had ceased was not, in his opinion, covered by the Act. See
note 31 supra.
55. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
56. Tenenbaum v. City of Chicago, 60 111. 2d 363, 376, 325 N.E.2d 607, 615 (1975)(Ryan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); McNellis v. Combustion Eng'r Inc., 58 Ill.
2d 146, 152, 317 N.E.2d 573, 576 (1974)(Ryan, J., dissenting).
57. For example, Tenenbaum received protection under section 66. However, section 66
is only applicable when an opening is used for hoisting materials, thereby limiting its
usefulness as a remedy.
58. Tenenbaum v. City of Chicago, 60 111. 2d 363, 376, 325 N.E.2d 607, 615 (1975)(Ryan,
J., dissenting).
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continue to influence the majority of the court, the coverage afforded by
the Act will be significantly restricted. Legislative action will be re-
quired to provide protection for workmen whose injuries are thus ex-
cluded from the Structural Work Act. Absent legislative action, work-
men will be in the difficult position of having to prove an action under
common law negligence theory.
Cynthia Salamone
